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Introduction
Banks' activities depend on conditions that prevail on markets where they provide financing for clients or source funding for their business. Policy makers may rely on regulatory instruments that influence either the asset side or the liability side of a bank's balance sheet (or both) in order to achieve their stability objectives: changes in banks' refinancing needs and/or conditions influence these institutions' investment decisions and thus determine scope and price of services offered to future clients. Prudential tools of this type appear particularly attractive if social planners seek to -2 -address banks' excessive lending or their risk-insensitive funding. The pursuit of policy objectives that transcend individual actors' interests and their indirect implementation through intentional changes in the framework conditions of (market) behavior hints at the governance dimension of the underlying regulatory strategy. 1 Macro-prudential supervision seeks to dampen activity levels on those lending markets that are seen to be exaggerating. It aims at safeguarding financial stability-narrowly understood as the soundness of the banking sector or more broadly construed as the stability of the economy and the financial system through the cycle 2 -by influencing the specific conditions for lenders/borrowers whereas monetary policy is geared towards impacting on the general financial conditions of the economy.
Quite similar, mandatory creditor participation (bail-in) strives to re-instill market discipline where pricing of bank-debt is regarded as distorted. By compelling the private sector to absorb the losses failing financials incur, the bail-in instrument is targeted on undoing implicit government guarantees for certain institutions and inducing markets to price bank-debt according to default probabilities only. As a result, banks' business activities that benefitted from risk-insensitive funding will be rescaled in accordance with their discrete risk-return profiles.
The banking union momentously modifies at least the implementation of the rules that provide both tool-kits and thus exercises an indirect, yet powerful influence on banks' relationships with (future) clients. This paper analyzes the pertinent regulatory mechanisms from this vantage and pays particular attention to the efficacy of the institutional arrangements in the banking union.
The implementation of macro-prudential policies in the banking union
This section assess the specific impact of the banking union on future contractual relations between banks and clients with a particular view to macro-prudential supervision. It sets the ground by delineating the operation of macro-prudential instruments and their interrelation with monetary policy. 3 It continues with identifying real-estate mortgage markets as a particular example where effective macro-prudential supervision may indeed contribute significantly to safeguarding financial stability. 4 Against this background it gauges the effectiveness of the allocation of competences between national and supranational institutions in the banking union and whether it will impact on bank-client relationships in a socially beneficial manner.
5 1 For surveys of the varying definitions of the subject employed in contemporary governance-research see e.g. Pierre 2000, pp. 3-6; Kjaer 2004, pp. 3-7; Williamson 2005; Burries et al. 2008, pp. 7-12. 2 For a description of macro-prudential supervision's different policy objectives see Borio 2003, pp. 183-185 and 2009, pp. 32-33; Hanson et al. 2011, pp. 5-7; Dewatripont and Tirole 2012, pp. 239, 249-250 In the broadest sense, macro-prudential supervision is a manifestation of the public governance of bank-client relationships that influences resource allocation in decentralized decisions (contracting). It determines the framework parameters of specific transactions and does so in order to promote the common good, i.e. the constant and reliable functioning of the financial system, mainly its liquidity supply function. In that sense, macro-prudential policy appears prima vista heteronomous, although the system's stability is ultimately in the collective interest of all agents transacting on financial markets. More importantly, in its mode of operation, macro-prudential supervision is akin to monetary policy and is also closely linked in its objectives.
In the standard model, monetary policy impacts on the general financial conditions for the economy. It sets the risk-free interest rate and thus immediately influences the price of leverage. The pertinent expectations determine agents' inter-temporal allocation of consumption which in turn is the key control mechanism to achieve price stability.
6
Quite similar, macro-prudential policy shapes the specific conditions for lenders and borrowers, in other words it targets exclusively the financial sector. Macroprudential tools set the price and quantity of risk-taking for banks. They work mainly through the balance sheet by influencing portfolio choices and requiring capital buffers. Their ultimate goal is to bolster financial stability which stands in a mutually reinforcing relationship with price stability (see figure 1   7 ).
The importance of a macro-prudential moderation of (unconventional) monetary policy measures
Quantitative easing (QE), that comes in the euro-area as the ECB's Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) 8 is supposed to work through portfolio rebalancing. The increased liquidity of private sector agents who look for alternative investment options will also raise the prices of -at leastother fixed income securities and thus generate broader welfare effects. The latter will boost demand which is the intended consequence from a monetary policy point of view. However, it also breeds the potential for bubbles and crashes on overheated asset markets and thus may endanger financial instability. As a consequence, the pertinent (unconventional) monetary policy measures -4 -require a macro-prudential policy counterweight 9 which does not cancel-out the desired impact of QE on price stability but moderates its latent negative effects on financial stability. Finally, the residual competence conferred upon designated macro-prudential authorities to implement stricter measures to counter changes in the intensity of macro-or systemic risks that are not addressed by other prudential measures in CRD IV/CRR (national flexibility measures), allows -subject to demanding procedures and the presentation of conclusive evidence -inter alia to increase own funds requirements.
20
Another capital-based, yet indirect way of influencing the cost of credit is an increase in the relevant multipliers for calculating own funds requirements. Under the standardized approach, supervisors can increase risk weights up to 150% for financial stability reasons if loss experience and forward looking market developments so suggest. 21 Again, both Pillar II and national flexibility measures can be implemented to the same effect and allow to raise risk weights even beyond 150%. 22 Similarly, if financial stability concerns command tightening lending conditions, banks that use an internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to calculate their regulatory capital requirements can be forced to use higher minimum loss given default (LGD) values in their models. 23 LGDs can also be influenced through Pillar II and national flexibility measures, for instance by raising the floor on LGDs used to calculate risk weights in the relevant formulas.
Finally, limits on lending activities like maximum loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI), or debtservice-to-income (DSTI) ratios can serve as direct measures to curb leveraged growth in asset markets. Despite calls for an EU-wide harmonization of these instruments that would enhance the capacity to capture the systemic dimensions of asset bubbles, 24 the current EU regulatory framework only refers to LTV and LTI limits as preconditions for relying on advantageous risk-weights under the standardized approach for fully and completely mortgage secured exposures. 25 Hence, direct limits on lending activites based on LTV, LTI or DSTI remain subject to national rules and procedures. 26 The same is true with regard to leverage ratios that can be understood as a failsafe for risk-based capital buffers in countering cyclical or structural systemic risks. 17 The effect hinges only partly on the assumption that equity is more costly than debt, cf. on this pecking order theory in corporate finance Myers and Majluf 1984 ; on the policy implications see also 
Effectiveness of macro-prudential tools in cooling-down overheated real-estate markets
The effectiveness of the macro-prudential tools just described varies in the context of real estate lending.
Capital buffers as such arguably are not very effective in highly collateralized markets. This posit is not oblivious of the fact that the pertinent buffers can reach sizeable proportions: even under the EU Commission's assumption that does not include the possibilities for exceptional increases of certain buffers, 27 they can amount to 9.5% of additional CET1. 28 However, the extra capital has to be held against risk-weighted assets which is why the buffers' effect is limited with regard to highly collateralized real estate loans. Even maxing-out the buffer rates wouldn't lead to tremendous increases in the capital to be held against the loan: in fact, even under the standardized approach, less than three and a half percent of the exposure value 29 of a residential mortgage secured loan would have to be 27 EU Commission 2013, p. 14. 28 With the assumed upper bounds the CCB can amount to 2,5% of CET1, the SRB to 5% of CET1 and the national macro flexibility buffer to 2% of CET1. 29 The accounting value of the loan is modified by credit risk adjustments to yield the exposure value, see CRR, art. 110, 111.
-7 -held in additional CET1. 30 Under the IRB approach, risk-weights can be expected to be significantly lower.
31
Moreover, capital buffers may have unintended consequences because they apply to supervised entities (banks) and thus can hardly be tailored in a market or transaction specific manner. At the margin, higher own funds requirements steer lending activities to credit markets where extended loans carry lower risk weights: as own funds ratios have to be multiplied with the applicable riskweights to determine actual regulatory capital requirements for specific assets, 32 any lending activity that creates balance sheet positions with risk-weights higher than those of (collateralized) real-estate loans becomes less attractive for banks and/or makes borrowing for clients relatively more expensive if banks can pass-on the higher refinancing costs. 33 As a consequence, where targeted banks do not have real estate-centered business models, increased buffers may even result in relatively more lending on overheated mortgage markets.
34
To be sure, the additional capital requirements are not trivial and may have a marginal effect also on credit growth in real estate markets. However, with a view to the specifics of these markets, it is quite plausible that indirect measures like a significant increase in risk-weights are far more effective because they eliminate the leveling effect of collateral that afflicts macro-prudential tools that ultimately rely on own funds requirements. 35 Similarly, outright caps on lending activities (LTV, LTI, DSTI) and a leverage ratio are more effective macro-prudential tools in these environments.
Competences in macro-prudential supervision within the banking union
To assess if the banking union as such has a discrete impact on future bank-client relationships also through macro-prudential instruments brought to bear on key markets, 36 a closer look at the allocation of pertinent competences between national and supranational supervisory bodies is necessary. The momentum of the new institutional framework depends critically on the ECB's position via-à-vis both the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and national competent authorities (NCAs). Only insofar as the ECB as the central authority in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) can play a strong and independent role in macro-prudential policy as well, will the situation within the banking union diverge from that in the EU 28. 30 The pertinent risk-weight is set at 35%, CRR Art. 125(1). It constitutes the relevant multiplier for the maximum buffer rate of 9.5% of CET1. 31 In a speech delivered on March 11 at the ECB and Its Watchers Conference 2015, Bank of Finland Governor Erkki Liikanen referred to an average risk-weight of 10% for real-estate loans which would squeeze additional CET1 needed to less than one percent. 32 Supra note 30. 33 Under the standardized approach for instance, (commercial) loans with a maturity of more than three months to institutions with a recognized credit rating of good-to-medium quality (credit quality step 2 or 3 out of 6) carry a risk-weight of 50%, cf. CRR art. 120(1). Thus, with macro-prudential buffers set at maximum ratios (supra note 28), banks would have to hold 4.75% of additional CET1 against these loans, making lending either relatively less profitable for banks or more costly for clients accordingly. Hence, the dampening effect of the pertinent macro-prudential measures will be stronger on these markets than it is on residential mortgage markets (see supra note 30 and accompanying text). 34 For the underlying theorems see supra note 17. 35 Assigning a risk weight of 150% to residential mortgage secured loans (instead of 35%, supra note 30) will more than quadruple the level of CET1 to be held against the exposure value, raising it from 2.8% to 12% CET1. 36 Supra 2.2.1.
-8 -
The role of the ESRB within the SSM
At the outset, it is important to observe that the ESRB assumes the role of the paramount supranational macro-prudential player in the EU also in relation to the ECB. 37 As a consequence, the ECB does not enjoy full autonomy in the implementation of macro-prudential policy in the banking union. Instead, its role is (lightly) confined by the duties and obligations owed to the ESRB.
The legal framework ensures an adequate flow of information gathered in supervisory practice to the ESRB in order to facilitate the fulfillment of its tasks. Hence, the relevant provisions explicitly permit the voluntary disclosure of information from the ECB (SSM) to the ESRB under the sole condition that the privacy of sensitive data is adequately protected. 38 Moreover, the ESRB can request relevant information from the ECB (SSM) under the same preconditions. 39 This indicates that the data gathered by the ECB and NCAs when fulfilling their supervisory tasks is by no means proprietary. Instead it also has to serve the purpose of allowing the ESRB to realize its macro-prudential stability objective.
Even more importantly, the ESRB can direct recommendations and warnings not only to NCAs within the SSM but also to the supervisory branch of the ECB. 40 To be sure, the legal basis of this power is not straight-forward, because the ECB obviously is not a "national supervisory authority" within the original meaning of ESRB Reg. art. 16(2). Yet, the provision has to be construed dynamically to reflect the institutional overhaul of the supervisory framework: The ECB has assumed the main supervisory functions, directly at least for the euro-area's most significant banks, 41 and thus has become the competent/supervisory authority that executes the prudential rules and standards referred to in EBA Reg. art. 1(2 -9 -power falls short of making it a momentous (macro-)prudential supervisor: 43 its recommendations and warnings are "enforced" through an internal "act or explain" mechanism 44 and public pressure exerted after their disclosure. 45 As a consequence, the ECB also has significant maneuvering space when it exercises its macro-prudential supervisory competences.
The ECB's role in macro-prudential supvervision
Ultimately, the distinct influence of the banking union on future bank-client relationships within the ambit of macro-prudential supervision depends on the ECB's specific powers in the field -only the latter constitute an unduplicated element distinguishing supervision in the SSM-Member States form that in the EU 28.
The key power of the ECB is to top-up national macro-prudential policies 46 which includes the capacity to require macro-prudential tools to be implemented for the first time if NCAs remain inert. Hence, the ECB can push through inconvenient banking policies that -captured 47 -NCAs may shun. The institutional arrangement thus immediately reflects the key rationale for the supranationalization of supervisory powers which was intended to reduce forbearance of NCAs.
48
Moreover, with a particular view to macro-prudential supervisory objectives, the ECB has the comprehensive view on the affected economies and can ideally assess the likely interaction of supervisory measures with monetary policy in the euroarea. 49 These benefits can be reaped without incurring severe negative consequences if the ECB's monetary policy function can be severed from its supervisory tasks without impeding the adequate flow of information.
50
43 For a general assessment of the ESRB's clout see Mülbert and Wilhelm 2011, p. 200; Wymeersch 2010, pp. 252-264; Moloney 2010 Moloney , pp. 1332 Moloney -35, 1365 Lamandini 2009, pp. 199-202 Smets 2014, pp. 264-265 . To be sure, the close integration of macro-prudential supervision with monetary policy in the euroarea may not constitute an attractive feature for Member States whose currency is not the euro if they opt for a close cooperation and thus seek to participate in the SSM as equal partners (cf. SSM-Reg. art. 7; Wymeersch 2014, pp. 61-62) . The macro-prudential function of the ECB raises specific coordination issues with national central banks not present within the euroarea. In the worst scenario, one party pushes the throttle while the other hits the break, creating a lot of heat but no progress. 50 Generally on the challenges of mandating a central bank with banking supervision Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1995; on the institutional preconditions taken in the SSM Reg. to prevent a corruption of either figure 2 -macro-prudential supervision in the banking union -10 -However, despite these general considerations in favor of the ECB's involvement, its role in macroprudential policy seems severely curtailed. Unfortunately this is particularly true with regard to those markets on which exaggerated lending typically poses severe risks for financial stability. 51 The ECB can only perform its supervisory tasks and implement (macro-prudential) instruments "in accordance with relevant Union law…subject to the procedures set out in the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU in the cases specifically set out in relevant Union law". 52 Hence, it is limited to the macro-prudential tool-kit provided by supranational law. It has no competence to initiate or modify macro-prudential measures with a legal basis only in unharmonized national law.
Given the pivotal importance of mortgage lending markets and the dubious effect of the primary CRD IV/CRR macro-prudential instruments (additional capital buffers) for these markets, 53 this division of competences (figure 2) is hard to square with the overall objectives of centralization in the banking union. In fact, the only promising tools through which the ECB can implement more rigid macroprudential policies are those that indirectly reinforce (sectoral) capital requirements by augmented risk weights or LGD values. 54 The ECB has no influence on direct restrictions through LTV, LTI, and DSTI.
3 Re-instilling market discipline through the bail-in tool
Another supervisory tool that potentially influences future bank client-relationships indirectly, yet momentously is the bail-in instrument. 55 This reorganization tool also receives a banking union twist because its implementation will be determined by supra-national authorities within the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). To gauge this specific effect of the banking union, the policy rationale that underpins the bail-in tool will be explored by recalling briefly the distorting effect of implicit government guarantees for bank capital 56 and the objective to re-instill market discipline by regulatory intervention that impacts on future bank client-relationships. 57 The general considerations set the stage on which the preconditions for an efficient bail-in tool can be established. 58 These serve in turn as benchmark for assessing if the banking union's bail-in tool indeed fulfills these criteria and thus can achieve the socially desirable influence on banks' activities. -11 -
Implicit government guarantees for bank capital (bail-out)
Government guarantees provide a lower bound to the value of assets on a bank's balance sheet and thus shift the default probability downward compared to a model with endogenously determined (asset valuation process) bank failure. Banks that benefit from implicit guarantees -because they are deemed "too big/important/interconnected etc. to fail" 60 -enjoy lower risk premiums and can thus raise capital from rational investors at lower prices.
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Distorted market pricing bears on the liability side of banks' balance sheets because they can raise capital at prices that are insensitive to their risk-taking behavior. As a consequence, the government subsidy allows them to fund excessive risktaking (moral hazard) and thus leads to inefficient investment decisions on the asset side of their balance sheet. In essence, debt-governance doesn't work, because financial institutions' risk bearing capacity does not drive the pricing of their capital (no market discipline). 
Regulatory intervention to re-instill market discipline (bail-in)
The observable market failure warrants regulatory intervention. The bail-in instrument seeks to address the root cause of the problem: its objective is to credibly ensure the private sector loss participation in a bank's failure, i.e. compel risk bearing of agents who provide banks' capital. 63 If effective, it undoes government guarantees (no bail-out). It thus ensures that banks funding is sensitive to the risks they are running and puts an end to excessive risk-taking, overinvestment etc. induced by moral hazard. 
Preconditions for an effective bail-in tool
The objective of the bail-in tool to induce adequate pricing of the risk of bank failure by all those investors who provide capital to these institutions determines the preconditions under which a regu-60 On the rationality of bail-outs, i.e. the rescue of ailing banks with public funds, in these scenarios Macey and Holdcroft, Jr. 2011, pp. 1375-83; Tröger 2013, p. 187-190. 61 For empirical evidence of the effect see Tsesmelidakis and Merton 2012 (estimating the funding advantage of 74 U.S. financials benefiting from implicit government guarantees to sum up to $365 bn.); Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis 2012 (showing how model-estimated risk premiums for bank debt deviated significantly from actual market premiums charged for major U.S. banks in CDS-markets through the financial crisis). 62 The effect was first modelled with regard to explicit government guarantees (deposit insurance), Merton 1977; see also Merton and Bodie 1993, but can be generalized, see e.g. Adrian and Ashcraft 2012, pp. 8-10. 63 Coffee Jr. 2010, p. 35; Huertas 2013, p. 168; Goodhart and Avgouleas 2014, pp. 3-5 ; see also Gordon and Ringe 2014, p . 2 who introduce a concept of SIFI "self-insurance" provided by subordinated term debtors;. For alternative, yet not necessarily contradicting views that understand bail-in primarily as an instrument to facilitate a large bank's (financial conglomerate's) swift reorganization without overly disruptive effects Sommer 2014, pp. 217-223; Binder 2014, pp. 34-35. 64 Cf. figure 3 figure 3 -risk insensitive funding and regulatory intervention through bail-in tool -12 -latory intervention can lead to efficient outcomes. The key desideratum is that -at least -sophisticated investors must be capable to price the risk adequately which requires an ex ante designation of the risk borne by investors. More specifically, a well-designed bail-in instrument needs to define a clear-cut, difficult to game trigger event (e.g. CET1 ratio), has to make bail-inable capital instruments identifiable and must allow predicting the particular consequences of the implementation of the tool (e.g haircuts/conversions occur automatically without discretion). 65 Once implemented, the bail-in instrument must not destabilize markets. In order to prevent knock-on effects, the bail-inable instruments have to be held outside the banking sector by investors with sufficient loss-bearing capacity (e.g. insurance companies, pension funds, high-net worth individuals, hedge-funds). Under these conditions, a bank failure may become a non-disruptive event that does not imperil market participants' trust in the financial sector. Banks' reorganizations potentially become akin to those of airlines that can today fly "out of chapter 11" without jeopardizing customer confidence.
Unfortunately, sophisticated investors will find it difficult to gauge the actual risk of loss-participation under the European regime, because BRRD/SRM provide for a discretionary ad hoc bail-in. First of all, the trigger event is set with the competent authority's (CRR-supervisor, ECB) or the resolution authority's (RA)/Single Resolution Board's (SRB) determination that an institution "is failing or likely to fail". 66 Hence, at the outset it will be difficult to predict in which state the failing institution will be when losses have to be borne. Moreover, the RA/SRB will chose the reorganization instrument(s) from a toolbox, 67 i.e. even if resolution proceedings are initiated no bail-in automatism exists. Furthermore, although in principle the entire liability side of the failing bank's balance sheet is subject to bail-in, some classes are exempted ex ante, for instance debt instruments with a maturity of less than seven days. 68 Finally, the RA/SRB may grant exemptions for certain bank-creditors. 
Key problems of bail-in tool
Although some fears may already be associated with the general exemption of certain liability classes because it may lead to regulatory arbitrage, for instance in the form of ultra-short-term inter-bank borrowing, the key problem of the European bail-in tool follows from the persistence of a political element in private sector loss participation under BRRD/SRM Reg.
The forecasting nature of the trigger event allows forbearing competent authorities to delay reorganization and resolution. 70 Hence, in this regard the impact of the banking union will depend on the stance the ECB (SSM) or -ultimately -the SRB will take vis-à-vis shaky banks. Although capture by local special interest seems unlikely, at least the ECB may face incentives to camouflage supervisory failures by postponing reorganization. Moreover, if supranational funds do not suffice to cover reor-
